Once one has asked the first dynamical question: "How is equilibrium reached?" it becomes impossible not to ask the more radical question: "Is equilibrium reached?" Perhaps it is not. If not, then it is important to canvass the ways in which may not be reached and explore complex non-convergent behavior permitted by the underlying dynamics. This essay will take a small step in that direction.
In particular, I will present numerical evidence for extremely complicated behavior in the evolutionary game dynamics introduced by Taylor and Jonker (1978) . This dynamics, which is based on the process of replication, is found at various levels of chemical and biological organization (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988) . For a taste of what is possible in this dynamics with only four strategies, see the "strange attractor" in figure 1. This is a projection of a single orbit for a four strategy evolutionary game onto the three simplex of the probabilities of the first three strategies. A strange attractor cannot occur in the Taylor-Jonker flow in three strategy evolutionary games because the dynamics takes place on a two dimensional simplex. Zeeman (1980) leaves it open as to whether strange attractors are possible in higher dimensions or not. This paper presents strong numerical evidence for the existence of strange attractors in the lowest dimension in which they could possibly occur.
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Si S Figure 1 : Parameter = 5 The plan of the paper is as follows: Sections 2, 3, and 4 introduce key concepts of games, dynamics, and evolutionary game dynamics. Section 5 will describe the fourstrategy evolutionary game which gives rise to chaotic dynamics, and the bifurcations which lead to chaos as the parameters of the model are varied. Section 6 will give a stability analysis of the equilibria encountered along the road to chaos described in section 5. Section 7 describes the numerical calculation of Liapunov exponents. Section 8 indicates some related literature, and discusses the relation to Lotka-Volterra ecological models. My second philosophical claim will be discussed in Section 9.
Games
We will be concerned with finite, non-cooperative, normal form games. There are a finite number of players and each player has a finite number of possible strategies.
Each player has only one choice to make and makes it without being informed of the choices of any other players. The games are to be thought of as non-cooperative. There is no communication or precommitment before the players make their choices. Each possible combination of strategies determines the payoffs for each of the players.
A specification of the number of players, the number of strategies for each player and the payoff function determines the game. A Nash equilibrium of the game is a strategy combination such that no player does better on any unilateral deviation. We extend players' possible acts to include randomized choices at specified probabilities over the originally available acts. The new randomized acts are called mixed strategies, and the original acts are called pure strategies. The payoffs for mixed strategies are defined as their expected values using the probabilities in the mixed acts to define the expectation (and assuming independence between different players acts.) We will assume that mixed acts are always available. Then every finite non-cooperative normal form game has a Nash equilibrium.
The game in example 1 has two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one at <bottom, right> and one at <top, left>. Intuitively, the former equilibrium is-in some sensehighly instable, and the latter equilibrium is the only sensible one. (1975) introduced the notion of a perfect equilibrium to capture this intuition. He considers perturbed games wherein each player rather that simply choosing a strategy, chooses to instruct a not perfectly reliable agent as to which strategy to choose. The agent has some small non-zero probabilities for mistakenly choosing each of the strategies alternative to the one he was instructed to choose. Probabilities of mistakes of agents for different players are uncorrelated. An equilibrium in the original game, which is the limit of some sequence of equilibria in perturbed games as the probability of mistakes goes to zero is called a (trembling-hand) perfect equilibrium. In any perturbed game for example 1, there is only one equilibrium, with row and column instructing their agents to play top and left and their agents doing so with probability of one minus the small probability of a mistake.
Selten
Classical game theory is intended as a theory of strategic interaction between rational human payoff-maximizers. It has sometimes been criticized as incorporating an unrealistically idealized model of human rationality. Maynard-Smith and Price (1973) found a way to apply game theory to model conflicts between animals of the same species. The rationale obviously cannot be that snakes or mule deer are hyperrational, but rather that evolution is a process with a tendency in the direction of increased payoff where payoff is reckoned in terms of evolutionary fitness. A rest point of such a process must be an optimal point. The insight that just such a tendency may be enough to make rational choice theory and game theory relevant can be carried back to the human realm, and accounts for much of the current interest in dynamic models of learning and deliberation in game theoretic contexts.
Maynard Smith and Price are interested in providing an evolutionary explanation of "limited war" type conflicts between members of the same species, without re-course to group selection. The key notion that they introduce is that of a strategy that would be a stable equilibrium under natural selection, an evolutionarily stable strategy. If all members of the population adopt that strategy, then no mutant can invade. Suppose that there is a large population, that contests are pairwise and that pairing is random. Then the relevant payoff is the average change in evolutionary fitness of an individual, and it is determined by its strategy and the strategy against which it is paired. These numbers can be conveniently presented in afitness matrix and can be thought of as defining the evolutionary game. The fitness matrix is read as giving row's payoff when playing against column. If we consider the two person non-cooperative normal form game associated with a fitness matrix, an evolutionarily stable strategy, x, induces a symmetric Nash equilibrium <x,x> of the game which has certain stability properties. Earlier, we considered Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium, which rules out certain instabilities. Evolutionary stability is a stronger requirement than perfection. If x is an evolutionarily stable strategy, then <x,x> is a perfect symmetric Nash equilibrium of the associated game, but the converse does not hold. In the game associated with the fitness matrix in example 5, <S2,S2> is a perfect equilibrium.2 Sl S2 S3 S1 1 0 -9 S2 0 0 -4 S3 -9 -4 -4
Example 5
S2, however, is not an evolutionarily stable strategy because U(SlIS2)=U(S21S2) and U(S 1IS1)>U(S21S1).
The concepts of equilibrium and stability in game theory are quasi-dynamical notions. How do they relate to their full dynamical counterparts when game theory is embedded in a dynamical theory of equilibration?
Dynamics
The state of a system is characterized by a state vector, x, which specifies the values of relevant variables. (In the case of prime interest here, the relevant variables will be the probabilities of strategies in a game.) The dynamics of the system specifies how the state vector evolves in time. The path that a state vector describes in state space as it evolves according to the dynamics is called a trajectory, or orbit. Time can either be modeled as discrete or as continuous. For the former case, a deterministic dynamics consists of a map which may be specified by a system of difference equations:
In the latter case, a deterministic dynamics is a flow which may be specified by a system of differential equations:
An equilibrium point is a fixed point of the dynamics. In the case of discrete time, it is a point, x of the state space such that f(x) = x. For continuous time, it is a state, x = <xl, ...,xi...> such that dxi/dt = 0, for all i. An equilibrium x is stable if points near to it remain near to it. More precisely, x is stable if for every neighborhood, V of x, there is a neighborhood, V', of x such that if the state y is in V' at time t=O, it remains in V for all time t > 0. A equilibrium, x, is strongly stable (or asymptotically stable) if nearby points tend towards it. That is, to the definition of stability we add the clause that the limit as t goes to infinity of y(t) = x.
An invariant set is a set, S, of points of the state space such that if the system starts at a point in S, then at any subsequent time the state of the system is still in S. A unit set is an invariant set just in case it's member is an equilibrium. A closed invariant set, S, is an attracting set if nearby points tend towards it; that is, if there is a neighborhood, V, of S such that the orbit of any point in V remains in V and converges to S.
An attractor is an indecomposable attracting set. [Sometimes other conditions are added to the definition.]
A dynamical system displays sensitive dependence on initial conditions at a point if the distance between the orbits of that point and one infinitesimally close to it increases exponentially with time. This sensitivity can be quantified by the Lyapunov exponent(s) of an orbit. For a one-dimensional map, x(t+l) = f(x(t)), this is defined as follows3: 1 lim n-log adf ,= limlog2-at xi n-oo n i=0
A positive Lyapunov exponent may be taken as the mark of a chaotic orbit. For example, consider the "tent" map:
Tent:
The derivative is defined and its absolute value is 2 at all points except x=l/2. Thus, for almost all orbits the Lyapunov exponent is equal to one.
An attractor for which the orbit of almost every point is chaotic is a strange attractor. For most known "strange attractors"-like the Lorenz attractor and the Rossler attractor-there is no mathematical proof that they are strange attractors, although the computer experiments strongly suggest that they are. The "strange attractor" in game dynamics which appears in figure 1 and which will be discussed in sections 5-7 has the same status.
Game Dynamics
A number of different dynamical models of equilibration processes have been studied in economics and biology. Perhaps the oldest is the dynamics considered by Cournot (1897) in his studies of oligopoly. There is a series of production quantity setting by the oligopolists, at each time period of which each oligopolist makes her optimal decision on the assumption that the others will do what they did in the last round. The dynamics of the system of oligopolists is thus defined by a best response map. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of this map. It may be dynamically stable or unstable, depending on the parameters of the Cournot model.
A somewhat more conservative adaptive strategy has been suggested by evolutionary game theory. Here we will suppose that there is a large population, all of whose members play pure strategies. The interpretation of a mixed strategy is now as a polymorphism of the population. Asexual reproduction is assumed for simplicity. We assume that individuals are paired at random, that each individual engages in one contest (per unit time), and that the payoff in terms of expected number of offspring to an individual playing strategy Si against strategy Sj is Ui--given in the ith row and jth column of the fitness matrix, U. The proportion of the population playing strategy Sj will be denoted by Pr(Sj). The expected payoff to strategy i is:
The average fitness of the population is: 
The Road to Chaos
In this section we will focus on the Taylor-Jonker flow. Flows are usually better behaved than the corresponding maps, but we will see that this dynamics is capable of quite complicated behavior. Taylor and Jonker already note the possibility of non-convergence because of oscillations in three strategy evolutionary games. They consider the game whose fitness matrix, U, is given in example 6 (where a is a parameter to be varied): S1 S2 S3 S1 However, with four strategies we get the strange attractor pictured in figure 1. (This is a projection of of the three dimensional simplex of probabilities for four strategies onto the two dimensional simplex of the first three strategies. The three dimensional structure, however, is fairly easy to see in the figure. ) There is a route to this strange attractor that leads through a generic Hopf bifurcation. Consider the fitness matrix, U, of example 7 (where a is the parameter to be varied): -1 -1 -10 1,000 -1.5 -1 -1 1,000 a .5 0 -1,000 0 0 0 0
Example 7
Figures 1 through 6 are snapshots taken along the path to chaos as this parameter is varied. At a=2.4 there is convergence to a mixed equilibrium as shown in figure 2. The orbit spirals in towards the mixed equilibrium which is visible as the white dot in the center of the orbit. As the value of a is raised there is a generic Hopf bifurcation giving rise to a limit cycle around the mixed equilibrium. This closed orbit is structurally stable; it persists for small variations in the parameter. It is also an attracting set. This closed orbit is shown for a=2.55 in figure 3. As the value of the parameter is raised further, the limit cycle expands and then undergoes a period doubling bifurcation. Figure 4 shows the cycle of period 2 at a=3.885. This is followed by another pe- 
Stability Analysis of Equilibria
As a suppliment and a check on the graphical information presented in the previous section, the interior equilibrium points along the route to chaos were calculated in high precision (40 decimal places) using Mathematica. The Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives was then evaluated at the equilibrium point, and its eigenvalues found. 
Numerical Calculation of Liapunov Exponents
Liapunov exponents were calculated numerically using the algorithm presented in Wolf et. al. (1985) Appendix A. This integrates the differential equations of the dynamical system to obtain a fiducial trajectory, and simultaneously integrates four copies of the linearized differential equations of the system with coefficients determined by the location on the fiducial trajectory, to calculate the Liapunov spectrum. The latter are started at points representing a set of orthonormal vectors in the tangent space, and are periodically reorthonormalized during the process. In the calculation, logarithms are taken to the base 2. The code was implemented for the replicator dynamics by Linda Palmer. Differential equations were integrated in double precision using the IMSL Library integrator DIVPRK. The program was tested running it at a=2, starting it on the attracting equilibrium. In this case, the spectrum of Liapunov exponents (when converted to natural logarithms) should just consist of the real parts of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated at the equilibrium, which were discussed in the last section. The experimental results of a run from t=0 to t=l 0,000 were in agreement with the theoretical results up to four or five decimal places:
Experimental Results
Theoretical The xi are the population densities, the ri the intrinsic growth or decay rates for a species, and the aij the interaction coefficients which give the effect of the jth species on the ith species.
The dynamics of two species Lotka-Volterra systems-either predator prey or two competing species-is well understood, and the dynamics of three and higher dimensional Lotka-Volterra systems is a subject of current research. Unstable cycles are possible in two dimensional (predator-prey) Lotka-Volterra systems, but chaos is not. In three dimensions, however, several apparent strange attractors have been found. The first was found by Vance (1978) and classified as spiral chaos by Gilpin (1979) . "Gilpin's strange attractor" has been extensively studied by Shaffer (1985 There is an intimate connection between the Taylor-Jonker game dynamics and the Lotka-Volterra dynamics, which is established by Hofbauer (1981) . A LotkaVolterra system with n species corresponds to an evolutionary game with n+1 strategies such that the game dynamics on the evolutionary game is topologically orbital equivalent to the Lotka-Volterra dynamics. To each species in the Lotka-Volterra system, there is a ratio of probabilities of strategies in the game with the same dynamics. Thus it is possible to use known facts about one kind of dynamical system to establish facts about the other. Hofbauer uses the known fact the 2 species Lotka-Volterra systems do not admit limit cycles to verify Zeeman's conjecture that 3 strategy evolutionary games do not admit stable limit cycles in the game dynamics. It is thus possible to investigate game dynamical pathology with an eye towards ecological pathology. The strange attractor of the previous section is, in fact, the game theoretic counterpart to Gilpin Let us return to the second philosophical thesis with which I began this essay. That is that When the underlying dynamics is taken seriously, it becomes apparent that equilibrium is not the central explanatory concept. Rather, I would take the central dynamical explanatory concept to be that of an attractor (or attracting set). Not all dynamical equilibria are attractors. Some are unstable fixed points of the dynamics. In the dynamical system of example 7 with a=5 there is an unstable equilibrium point which is never seen. And not all attractors are equilibria. There are limit cycles, quasiperiodic attractors, and strange attractors. The latter combine a kind of internal instability with macroscopic asymptotic stability. Thus, they can play the same kind of explanatory role as that of an attracting equilibrium-although what is explained is a different kind of phenomonon.
Even this latter point, however, must be taken with a grain of salt. That is because of the possibility of extremely long transients. In example 7 with a=4, if we had omitted only the first 50 time units, we would not have eliminated the transient, and the plot would have looked like the strange attractor of figure 1 rather than one of a limit cycle. If transients are long enough, they may govern the phenomonae of interest to us. The concept of an attractor lives at t = infinity, but we do not. 
